



# IPv6 Deployment - Security Issues

## Thinking outside the NAT box

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# Agenda:

## Introduction

IPv4 lifetime

Conflicting views on what security means

Environments diversity

Layered Access & Scope

NAT vs. NAP


IPv6 approaches to avoid header manipulation

General security issues


Similar & Modified

Summary

# Allocation of IPv4 /8 blocks per month by IANA




# Pool exhaustion



Full discussion at: [www.cisco.com/ipj](http://www.cisco.com/ipj)

**The Internet Protocol Journal**  
Volume 8, Number 3, September 2005

# Summing it up



# Introduction



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- **Discussions around IPv6 security have centered on IPsec**
  - **Though IPsec is mandatory in IPv6, the same issues with IPsec deployment remain from IPv4:**
    - **Configuration complexity & Key management**
    - **Many IPv6 stacks do not today support IPsec**
    - **Therefore, IPv6 will be deployed largely without cryptographic protections of any kind**
- **Security in IPv6 is a much broader topic than just IPsec**
  - **Even with IPsec, there are many threats which still remain issues in IP networking**
- **Marketing has done a good job of convincing consumers to deploy NAT to improve the security of their network.**
  - **Despite that effort, the technology of address translation and header manipulation does not improve security.**
- **IPv6 makes some things better, other things worse, and most things are just different, but no more or less secure**

# Conflicting views on network security

- Privacy end-to-end eliminates opportunity for a compromised node or shared media segments to be used for man-in-the-middle attacks.
- Traceability is mandatory for both diagnostics and to comply with many laws.

Privacy Extensions limit the exposure to a security threat that targets a host IPv6 address directly. This is great for making an end host harder to identify to an attacker, but it also makes an end host harder to identify to the network administrator

- ❖ Securing at IP layer between the endpoints allows transport flows to obtain or share a security association without requiring application awareness or involvement.
- ❖ Firewalls expect visibility to ensure only authorized traffic crosses the border.

# Privacy based addressing



- **Temporary addresses for IPv6 host client application, eg. Web browser / soft-phone**

**Inhibit device/user tracking**

From RFC 3041: “[mac derived] interface identifier ...facilitates the tracking of individual devices (and thus potentially users)...”

**Random 64 bit interface ID, run DAD before using it**

**Rate of change based on local policy**


**Reduces attack profile as device stops answering when no longer valid**

- **More general use counters direct attack threats**

**Administrators may adopt easy to remember addresses (::10, ::20, ::F00D, IPv4 last octet)**

**IPv6 addresses derived from IEEE Organizational Unit Identifier (OUI) designations, allow scanning focus on popular NIC vendor’s ranges**

# Traceability to the subnet




- **The allocation process implemented by the Registries:**
  - IANA allocates from 2001::/16 to registries
  - Each registry gets a /23 prefix from IANA
  - Current policy, Registry allocates a /32 or shorter prefix to an IPv6 ISP
  - Then the ISP allocates a /48 prefix to each customer (or potentially /64)

<http://www.apnic.net/docs/policy/ipv6-address-policy.html>

- **All packets tracable to the specific subnet**
- **Public servers will still be registered in DNS**


# Internet Environment Diversity



# Environments

Infrastructure policy explicitly different from customer systems

Professional Management Staff



No Staff

End system & Infrastructure share policy


# Layered access & scope

Addresses are assigned to interfaces  
change from IPv4 model :

**Interface 'expected' to have multiple addresses**

Addresses have scope

- Link Local
- Local
- Global




Addresses have lifetime

**Valid and Preferred lifetime**

**Keeping applications restricted within the scope that meets policy reduces the attack profile in the event that other layers of security fail. Since local prefixes will not be routed in the global Internet, remote attackers will not even see or reach the network edge.**

# Local IPv6 Unicast Addresses – FC00::/7





- Prefix FC00::/7 prefix to identify Local IPv6 unicast addresses.
- One bit to identify local generation vs. reserved
- Global ID 40-bit global identifier used to create a globally unique prefix.
- Subnet ID 16-bit subnet ID is an identifier of a subnet within the site.
- Interface ID 64-bit IID

# Communities of Interest

mIPv6 provides opportunity for function specific addressing

- **Manufacturer / service agency appliance monitoring**
- **Access restrictions based on authorization**





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
General security issues

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### Summary

# Traditional IPv4 Edge Security Design

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- This design can be augmented with IDS, application proxies, and a range of host security controls
- The 3-interface FW design as shown here is in use at thousands of locations worldwide
- Firewall policies are generally permissive outbound and restrictive inbound
- As organizations expand in size the number of “edges” and the ability to clearly identify them becomes more difficult

# IPv6 Network Architecture Protection



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- **NAP – A set of IPv6 techniques that may be combined on an IPv6 site to simplify and protect the integrity of its network architecture, without the need for Address Translation**

<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-v6ops-nap-01.txt>

# Market perceived benefits of IPv4 NAT




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<b>Function</b>	<b>IPv4</b>	<b>IPv6</b>
<b>Simple Gateway</b>	DHCP – single address upstream  DHCP – limited number of individual devices downstream	DHCP-PD – arbitrary length customer prefix upstream  SLAAC via RA downstream
<b>Simple Security</b>	Filtering side effect due to lack of translation state	Explicit Context Based Access Control (Reflexive ACL)
<b>Local usage tracking</b>	NAT state table	Address uniqueness
<b>End system privacy</b>	NAT transforms device ID bits in the address	Temporary use privacy addresses
<b>Topology hiding</b>	NAT transforms subnet bits in the address	Untraceable addresses using IGP host routes /or MIPv6 tunnels for stationary
<b>Addressing Autonomy</b>	RFC 1918	RFC 3177 & ULA
<b>Global Address Pool Conservation</b>	RFC 1918	340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,768,211,456 (3.4*10 <sup>38</sup> ) addresses
<b>Renumbering and Multi-homing</b>	Address translation at border	Preferred lifetime per prefix & Multiple addresses per interface


# Simple Gateway

## IPv4



- Fixed configuration local DHCP server provides private IPv4 address space to internal hosts.
- NAT function shares across all internal network devices the single IPv4 address acquired from the service provider DHCP.


## IPv6



- Simple router acquires delegated prefix for use across all internal network devices using DHCP-PD, announcing that internally via a Router Advertisement.
- External interface of the router could function using only the LinkLocal prefix on the interface connecting to the upstream router.

# Simple Security


## IPv4



- The filtering side effect in a NAT due to lack of translation state does not provide predictable security.
- The header modifications at the NAT reduce overall security since the receiver can not determine which device originated the packet.



## IPv6

- Explicit Context Based Access Control
  - Reverse Path Forwarding (RPF) filter
- Only allow the DHCP-PD prefix out as the source address in any packet.



# Local Usage Tracking



## IPv4



- This state database can be harvested to track which internal node interacted with target external addresses at specified points in time.


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
# End System Privacy

## IPv4



- All internal devices appear to be the same from the outside.


## IPv6



- Privacy enabled nodes periodically generate new addresses based on lifetime policy.
- In some situations they might use a different address for each new connection they establish.


# Topology Hiding

## IPv4



- All internal devices appear to be the same from the outside, masking both the host and network topology.

## IPv6



- Internal nodes appear to be hosted on a logical subnet attached to the edge router no matter which approach is used.
- In the IGP host routing approach an explicit host entry is injected for hidden nodes (limited due to IGP capacity).
- In the mobile IP approach the HomeAgent tunnels to the CareOfAddress and blocks all path optimization messages.

# Addressing Autonomy


## IPv4




- Private address space defined in RFC 1918. Allows for one /8, one /12, and one /16 to be autonomously managed (some organizations have exceeded these limits).
- Overlapping use creates problems when interconnecting private local networks.
- Provider changes are limited to public edge device.

## IPv6

- Private use address space defined as Unique Local Addresses (ULA). Allows each organization to autonomously manage as many /48 prefixes as they need for internal use. (65536 subnets per /48 prefix)
- 40 bit randomized field minimizes the potential for overlap when interconnecting private local networks.
- Router announcement simplifies global use prefix overlay for nodes that need to communicate externally.
- Provider changes can be limited to DHCP-PD server.



# Global Address Pool Conservation



- IPv4 – 32 bits

4,294,967,296 addresses


- IPv6 – 128 bits

340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,768,211,456

addresses

# Multi-homing & Renumbering


## IPv4



- External interfaces on the NAT are the only points aware of the actual public addresses, so they can be changed with minimal effort.

## IPv6

- Router Advertisement includes prefixes for any provider(s) the network manager wants that specific subnet to use. Hosts use longest match with dst address to select src.
- Transition between providers simplified as preferred-lifetime is set longer on the new, while the valid is left for the overlap duration on the old.





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Similar & Modified

### Summary

# Types of Threats (1/2)

- **Reconnaissance** - Provide the adversary with information enabling other attacks
- **Unauthorized Access** - Exploit the open transport policy inherent in the IPv4 protocol
- **Header Manipulation and Fragmentation** - Evade or overwhelm network devices with carefully crafted packets
- **Layer 3 – Layer 4 Spoofing** - Modify the IP address and port information to mask the intent or origin of the traffic
- **ARP and DHCP Attacks** - Subvert the host initialization process or a device the host accesses for transit
- **Broadcast Amplification Attacks (smurf)** - Amplify the effect of an ICMP flood by bouncing traffic off of a network which inappropriately processes directed ICMP echo traffic
- **Routing Attacks** - Disrupt or redirect traffic flows in a network

# Types of Threats (2/2)

- **Viruses and Worms** - Attacks which infect hosts and optionally automate propagation of the malicious payload to other systems
- **Sniffing** - Capturing data in transit over a network
- **Application Layer Attacks** - Broad category of attacks executed at Layer 7
- **Rogue Devices** - unauthorized devices connected to a network
- **Man-in-the-Middle Attacks** - Attacks which involve interposing an adversary between two communicating parties
- **Flooding** - Sending bogus traffic to a host or network designed to consume enough resources to delay processing of valid traffic

# Attacks fundamentally the same between IPv6 & IPv4



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- **Sniffing**

Without IPsec, IPv6 is no more or less likely to fall victim to a sniffing attack than IPv4

- **Application Layer Attacks**

Even with IPsec, the majority of vulnerabilities on the Internet today are at the application layer, something that IPsec will do nothing to prevent

- **Rogue Devices**

Rogue devices will be as easy to insert into an IPv6 network as in IPv4


- **Man-in-the-Middle Attacks (MITM)**

Without IPsec, any attacks utilizing MITM will have the same likelihood in IPv6 as in IPv4

- **Flooding**

Flooding attacks are identical between IPv4 and IPv6

# Reconnaissance



- At 100M pings / second (40 Gbps fdx), it takes **> 5,800 years** to scan the address range for just one subnet.

*Worm and virus propagation will fail or will have to find an alternative search path.*

*So will scanning based network management products...*

# L3 - L4 Spoofing

- **L3 Spoofing is very common in IPv4, RFC 2827 defines mechanisms to largely eliminate L3 spoofing but this has not seen broad adoption in IPv4 networks.**
  - Note that RFC 2827 stops the spoofing of the network portion of an IP address, not the host portion**
- **L4 Spoofing can be done in concert with L3 spoofing to attack systems (most commonly running UDP, I.e. SNMP, Syslog, etc.**
- **Nearly 25% of the current IPv4 space has not been allocated, and around 8% more is reserved for special use (RFC3330) making it fairly easy to block at network ingress through bogon filtering.**
- **IPv6 deployments should deploy the filtering discussed in RFC 2827 at every point up the aggregation hierarchy.**

# Translation and Tunneling

- **Tunneling and Address Translation are security issues regardless of protocol**
- **Tunneling - IPv4 over HTTP, ICMP tunneling, etc.**
  - These have been covert channel for hackers for many years.**
  - IPv6 tunnels are only one other avenue of attack and the approaches to deal with it are the same as IPv4 tunnels.**
- **NAT has been a challenge to security as well.**
  - NAT limits the ability to trace an attack to a source machine**
  - IPv4 NAT has been known to break applications and efforts to secure them.**
  - NAT-PT allows IPv4 to interact with IPv6 but has the same issues as IPv4/IPv4 NAT.**



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# Summary (1/2)

- **‘Security’ is a function of perspective. For example, content privacy is a security value to the end user, while content inspection is a security value to the network manager tasked with asset protection.**
- **In most environments the IP layer is not responsible for security, but stability and uniqueness at the IP layer are relied on by many security functions and mechanisms.**
- **IPsec is required in all IPv6 implementations; so authenticity and data privacy will be simpler when keys exist, therefore more likely to be used.**
- **Scanning is a futile effort in IPv6 networks, both for attackers and for network management tools.**
- **There are native IPv6 alternatives for the perceived beneficial functions of IPv4/NAT that avoid the application failures caused by address translation.**

# Summary (2/2)



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- **IPv6 makes some things better, other things worse, and most things are just different, but no more or less secure:**

## **Better**

**Automated scanning and worm propagation is harder due to huge subnets**

**Link-local addressing can limit infrastructure attacks**

**IPsec will be routinely available for use where keys exist**

## **Worse**

**Lack of familiarity with IPv6 among operators**

**Multiple addresses per interface is a different concept**


**Immaturity of software in the next few years**

**Improperly deployed transition techniques**

# Questions?



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# Reference Materials

- **IPv6 IPv4 Threat Comparison and Best Practice Evaluation, Convery and Miller**  
[http://www.cisco.com/security\\_services/ciag/documents/v6-v4-threats.pdf](http://www.cisco.com/security_services/ciag/documents/v6-v4-threats.pdf)
- **S Deering, R Hinden, “Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification” (December 1998), RFC 2460 at**  
<http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2460.txt>
- **R Hinden, S Deering, “IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture” (April 2003), RFC 3513 at**  
<http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3513.txt>
- [www.cisco.com/ipv6](http://www.cisco.com/ipv6)
- **See the best practice whitepaper for more references**

# Recommended Reading

- **Cisco Self-Study: Implementing Cisco IPv6 Networks (IPV6), Regis Desmeules, CiscoPress**
- **IPv6 Essentials, Silvia Hagen, O'Reilly**
- **IETF IPv6 Mailing List for updates on IETF drafts and RFCs**

**Really there's good comprehensible information here :-)**

**<http://playground.sun.com/pub/ipng/html/instructions.html>**